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Westman and Stromire: Why Not Bury M'Naghten's Moldy Ghost?

NOTES
WHY NOT BURY M'NAGHTEN'S MOLDY GHOST?
A madman is punished only by his madness.
CoKE

Since 1890 there have eighteen homicide cases appealed in Florida
involving the defense of insanity; of this number, more than one third
have arisen since 1954.1 Whether this sharp increase is attributable
to a greater awareness of psychiatric knowledge or a more concentrated attempt by shrewd defense counsel to evade capital punishment
cannot be ascertained. Whatever the reason, the use of insanity as a
criminal defense needs critical evaluation. Nearly every area of human
endeavor reflects the many scientific and cultural achievements of
the last hundred years, but the law of criminal responsibility has
remained static, impervious to change. The century-old legal test of
insanity, the M'Naghten Rule, supported by an overwhelming number of judicial opinions, has become firmly entrenched over the
years. It is submitted that a careful analysis of this ancient precedent
will reveal that it has outlived its usefulness and should be discarded.
This note will discuss the procedural aspects of raising insanity
as a criminal defense, the history and development of the M'Naghten
Rule, the Florida cases in which insanity has been used as a defense,
and the possible alternatives to the M'Naghten Rule.
FLORIDA INSANITY PROCEDURE

The insanity of an accused can be raised as a bar to trial,2 a defense to the commission of the crime charged 3 a bar to the imposition
5
of sentence 4 and a bar to capital punishment.
Bar to Trial
All persons are presumed to be sane, 6 but should a reasonable
'See cases cited notes 51, 52 infra.
2FLA. STAT. §917.01 (1957); see Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1957).
3Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892).
4FLA. STAT. §§921.08-.09 (1957).
51d. §922.07.
6Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902).

[1841
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doubt arise as to an accused's sanity prior to trial, the trial court is
required to hold a hearing upon the issue. 7 This is predicated upon
the proposition that a person should not be tried for a crime unless
he is capable of assisting in the preparation of his own defense. Counsel need only file with the trial court a motion suggesting insanity
in order to raise the issue.8 When the accused's sanity is in issue
prior to trial, the court may appoint one or more qualified experts
to determine his mental condition. 9 The report of this investigating
body is advisory only; 10 the responsibility for determining the sanity
of the accused rests with the court."' The pretrial issue of insanity
is whether the accused has sufficient mental ability to plead to the
indictment or information and prepare his defense.12 In this respect
the accused has the burden of showing insanity by a preponderance
of the evidence. 3 Should the accused be found insane and incapable
of standing trial, the trial court must commit him to a mental institution for treatment;' 4 however, the trial court retains jurisdiction
over him.' 5
Closely allied to this procedure is the statutory provision relating
to criminal sexual psychopaths, 6 which is designed to provide treatment for those persons who are neither insane nor feeble-minded but
who suffer from a mental disorder, have criminal propensities for
the commission of sex offenses, and are dangerous to others. Resort
may be had to these proceedings on motion of the accused, the court,
or the prosecuting attorney whenever a person has been charged with
or convicted of a crime, regardless of whether the crime constitutes a
sex offense. The circuit court has the duty of determining whether
the accused is a criminal sexual psycopath. In making this determination the court is required to appoint at least two phychiatrists to examine him. If the accused is found to be a criminal sexual psychopath,
7FLA. STAT. §917.01 (1957); see Brock v. State, 69 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1954).
8FLA. STAT. §917.01 (1957).

91bid.
1Oflrock v. State, 69 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1954).
"See note 7 supra. It is the opinion of the attorney general that this duty
cannot be delegated to an inferior court. Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 748 (1946).
"2State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207 (1933).
"sBrock v. State, 69 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1954).
'4FLA. STAT. §917.01 (2) (1957).
15lbid. But see Tippodo v. Rogers, 54 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1951), in which the indictment had been unconditionally nol prossed by the circuit court on motion of the

state's attorney.
16Fla. Laws Extra. Sess. 1957, ch. 57-1989.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol12/iss2/3

2

Westman
and Stromire:
Not BuryLAW
M'Naghten's
Moldy Ghost?
UNIVERSITY
OFWhy
FLORIDA
REVIEW
he is committed to an institution for treatment. This determination
will not excuse the commission of the offense but will bar trial or the
imposition of sentence until such time as he is no longer considered a
menace to others. He may then be returned to the trial court for
further criminal proceedings.
Defense to the Commission of the Crime Charged
When the accused intends to rely upon insanity as a defense to the
commission of a crime, no evidence is admissible at the trial unless
prior notice of the defense is given to the prosecution. 1 The notice
must state the nature of the insanity that is expected to be proved
and name the witnesses to be used in that proof. The accused is presumed to be sane even though notice has been given that insanity
will be used as a defense, 8 and this presumption does not fall until
evidence of insanity is presented. 19 The state may offer evidence
in rebuttal after the defense has rested its case, because the sanity
of the accused was not previously in issue.20
Expert witnesses are normally used to prove the mental condition
of the accused, but the opinions of lay witnesses are also admissible
if based on their observation of facts that tend to show insanity.1
Although there is no Florida case on point, other jurisdictions have
held that the opinion of an expert witness as to the accused's sanity
is inadmissible if based in whole or in part on the statements of third
persons not appearing before the jury.- The underlying reason for
this is that the jury cannot pass on the credibility of the statements
upon which the expert bases his opinion.
Since the sanity of the accused at the time of commission of the
crime is a question of fact for the jury, 23 the accused is entitled to an
17FLA.

STAT. §909.17 (3) (1957): "Upon good cause shown for the omission

of the notices and procedure as to the defense of insanity, as here set forth, the

court may in its discretion permit the introduction of evidence of such defense."
'sDavis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902). However, if an accused has been
adjudged insane prior to the crime, he is presumed to continue to be insane until

proved otherwise. Crews v. State, 143 Fla. 263, 196 So. 590 (1940).
19Farrell v. State, 101 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1958).
2OHodges v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. 593 (1890).
21Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892).
22E.g., Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 6 P.2d 455 (1931); People v. Black, 367 I1.
209, 10 N.E.2d 801

(1937); State v. Layton, 125 N.J.L. 120, 14 A.2d 771

(Sup. Ct.

1940); People v. Keough, 276 N.Y. 148, 11 N.E.2d 570 (1937).
23Brock v. State, 69 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1954).
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acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.24 When the
accused is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the jury must so
state in the verdict. 25 The court has several alternatives when this
type of verdict is returned. If the court believes that the defendant is
dangerous to others, he may be committed to jail, a mental institution,
or to his friends for proper care and protection.26 If the court believes
that the defendant is not dangerous to others, he must be discharged.27
The trial court may give an instruction as to the disposition of the
s
defendant if the jury acquits by reason of insanity.2
Bar to the Imposition of Sentence and CapitalPunishment
Insanity will prevent imposition of sentence and imposition of
the death penalty. A defendant may allege that he has become insane
since the verdict was rendered, in which event the court must, if it
has reasonable cause to believe this assertion, conduct a hearing to
determine his mental fitness.29 The court must decide the issue, and
in the event the defendant is found to be insane he must be committed
to a mental institution.30 After the imposition of a death sentence,
if the warden has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant
has become insane since he was sentenced, the governor must be
notified.31 The governor must suspend execution of the sentence until
the question of the defendant's sanity has been determined.32 If he is
found to be insane he must be committed to the state hospital until
his sanity is restored, at which time the death penalty must be imposed.
HISTORY

In ancient times lunatics were not regarded as suffering from a
24Farrell v. State, 101 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1958).
25FLA. STAT. §919.11 (1957).
2GIbid.
27Ibid.
2SMcClure v. State, 104 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1958).
29FLA. STAT. §921.09 (19571.
soIbid.
s91d. §922.07. This statute has not been expressly revised since the creation of
the Department of Corrections in 1957. There may be a question whether it is
the responsibility of the warden or the director of that department to determine if
there is reasonable ground to believe the defendant has become insane and notify

the governor.
32FLA. STAT.

§922.07 (1957).
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disease but were believed to be possessed by evil spirits or demons.
As punishment for this wickedness, "they deserved to be and were
beaten, kept in chains, and not uncommonly sentenced to death by
burning or hanging." 33 As the centuries passed, society began to
adopt a more charitable attitude toward these unfortunates. At an
early date the concept of mens rea, or "guilty mind," became an
integral part of the criminal law of England. A natural consequence
of this development was recognition of the defense of insanity, because a madman or lunatic could not formulate a felonious intent.A3
In the early part of the eighteenth century an English court declared
that a person accused of crime might escape punishment if he was
unable to distinguish between good and evil - in the words of the
court, if he "does not know what he is doing no more than . . . a
wild beast."5 This "wild beast test" was modified a few years later
when the terms right and wrong were substituted for good and evil;
the accused was no longer required to be reduced to a bestial level.36
For over a century the law concerning the criminal responsibility of
the insane was relatively uncertain, but this uncertainty was eliminated
7
in 1843 as a result of the famous M'Naghten case.3
Daniel M'Naghten, a Scotsman, shot Edward Drummond, the
principal secretary of Prime Minister Robert Peel, believing him to
be Peel. There is apparently little doubt that M'Naghten was insane at the time he committed the crime, as he was subject to hallucinations and delusions of persecution. The medical evidence in the
case was, in substance, that the prisoner was affected by morbid delusions that carried him beyond the power of his own control and
left him with no perception of right and wrong and incapable of
exercising any control over acts connected with his delusion. The
jury found M'Naghten "not guilty, by reason of insanity. ' ' 3
After M'Naghten's acquittal, the fifteen judges of England were
called before the House of Lords to answer five questions concerning
the existing law of insanity. In effect, the judges were called to
account for what seemed to be a miscarriage of justice; as Judge
Biggs has expressed it, "The Queen and the lords put a hot fire to the
33Sobeloff, From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond, in
136, 137 (1958).

CRIME AND INSANITY

34BIGGs, THE GUILTY MIND 81 (1955).

35Rex v. Arnold, 16 St. Tr. 695, 764 (K.B. 1724).
36Ferrer's Case, 19 St. Tr. 886 (K.B. 1760).
3710 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
SSWEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 59
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feet of the judges of England."3 9 In their answers to the questions,
fourteen of the fifteen judges agreed: 40
"[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to
be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of
reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be
proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong."
It is anomalous, under the concept of stare decisis, that an advisory
opinion would carry any weight as precedent, yet this advisory opinion
"has carried and still carries probably more weight than any actual
decision in history, with the possible exception of Shelley's case." 41
Although the answers to the various questions propounded to the
judges have separately influenced the law of criminal responsibility,
the primary rule that was wrested from those answers was the "rightand-wrong test." Few rules of law date back to 1843, yet this rightand-wrong test, commonly referred to as the M'Naghten Rule, remains the sole test of criminal responsibility in England and an
overwhelming majority of the states. 42
Fourteen states, although retaining the M'Naghten Rule as the
basic test, have modified or supplemented it with the "irresistible
impulse doctrine."4 3 This doctrine, in essence, provides that one
suffering from a mental disease who is driven to the commission of a
criminal act by an impulse over which he has no control is not guilty
because he is an involuntary agent incapable of formulating a criminal
intent."4 The Kentucky Supreme Court, in 1864, was one of the first
to accept this theory that a defendant should not be held responsible
for antisocial impulses stemming from severe mental disorder, citing
(1955).
4010 C. & F. 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 722 (H.L. 1843).
39BIGS, THE GUILTY MiND 107
41

"VWEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 11 (1956).
42See Tabulation, CRIME AND INSANITY 258 (1958).
43MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft No.
44See

4 1955).

Annot., 70 A.L.R. 659 (1930).
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homicidal mania, pyromania, and kleptomania as common examples
45
of irresistible impulsive behavior.
M'NAGHTEN IN FLORIDA

Florida has been aligned with the weight of authority for many
years in relying solely on the M'Naghten Rule as a test of criminal
responsibility. The right-and-wrong test was expressly adopted by
the Florida Supreme Court at the turn of the century in the leading
case of Davis v. State.46 Prior to the Davis case appeals had been taken
from only three cases in which insanity was used as a defense47 two
of these involved the same defendant.48 All three convictions were
reversed, two because of improper jury instructions49 and the third
for failure of the state to sustain its burden of overcoming a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's sanityso Since adopting the right-andwrong test and affirming the conviction in the Davis case, the Florida
Supreme Court has affirmed convictions in eight of the eleven reported
cases appearing before it in which the defense of insanity was raised. 51
52
Three other cases ended at the level of the district court of appeal,
53
and in two of these the conviction was reversed.
That the law has remained "frozen, fixed, in a mold .. . divorced
from reality"' 4 while medical science has progressed tremendously in
the exploration and understanding of mental disease is evident from a
45Smith v. Commissioner, 1 Duv. 224 (Ky. 1864).
4644 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902).

47Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892); Armstrong v. State, 27 Fla.
366, 9 So. 1 (1891); Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. 593 (1890).
4SArmstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892); Armstrong v. State, 27
Fla. 366, 9 So. 1 (1891).
49Armstrong v. State, 27 Fla. 366, 9 So. 1 (1891); Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. I, 7
So. 593 (1890).
SOArmstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892).
SiFarrell v. State, 101 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1958) (reversed); Everett v. State, 97
So.2d 241 (Fla. 1957); Warner v. State, 84 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1955); Brock v. State, 69
So.2d 344 (Fla. 1954); Stanton v. State, 148 Fla. 732, 5 So.2d 4 (1911); Crews v. State,
143 Fla. 263, 196 So. 590 (1940); Collins v. State, 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880 (1925);
Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513 (1919); Cochran v. State, 65 Fla. 91, 61 So.
187 (1913) (reversed); Scott v. State, 64 Fla. 490, 60 So. 355 (1912) (reversed);
Starke v. State, 49 Fla. 41, 37 So. 850 (1905).
52McClure v. State, 104 So.2d 601 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Mitchell v. State, 104
So.2d 84 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Griffin v. State, 96 So.2d 424 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
53Mitchell v. State, supra note 52; Griffin v. State, supra note 52.
54

BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 108 (1955).
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perusal of the Florida opinions discussing insanity. For example, in
Armstrong v. State55 in 1892 the defense relied heavily on the testimony of lay witnesses to establish insanity. One witness testified,
"There is insanity in the family ....
[Aiccused's aunt . ..lost her
mind. The sister of the accused lost her mind.... She got burned up
in a crazy fit."' 0 Another witness noticed the accused acting strangely
about two months prior to the killing and offered him a cot to lie on;
instead the accused "went off to an old outhouse, and stayed there." 57
Contrast this evidence with the expert medical testimony based on
observations, psychological tests, hospital records, and examinations
of the accused that was offered in Farrellv. State,58 a 1958 decision.
It would be unfair to suggest that the Florida Supreme Court has
not been cognizant of the remarkable expansion of medical knowledge
concerning the analysis and treatment of mental disease in the last
half-century, or that the Court is entirely satisfied with the M'Naghten
Rule. In Stanton v. State-9 the majority of the Court affirmed a conviction of first degree murder. Medical testimony depicted the defendant as a shrewd, egotistical, calculating, and domineering individual with criminal inclinations so strong that he was callous to all
law and morality. Justice Buford, in a strong dissenting opinion,
stated:6 0
"It is sufficient to say that my conclusion is . . . that the defendant was of sufficient mentality to know right from wrong
. . .but that the mental aberrations or hallucinations . . .
which he is shown to have experienced at the time of the commission of the crime.., were such that he was not capable of
forming a premeditated design for which he was responsible."
Since the defendant could not form a premeditated design, Justice
Buford advocated applying the irresistible impulse doctrine to reduce
the judgment to second degree murder. But the majority, while expressing sympathy for the defendant, would not allow sentiment to
interfere with duty, saying, "Society, as a matter of self-defense, is
committed to our rule.61
5530 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892).
561d. at 620.
57bid.
58101 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1958).
59148 Fla. 732, 5 So.2d 4 (1941).
Gold. at 739, 5 So.2d at 6.
Gild. at 735, 5 So.2d at 5.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol12/iss2/3

8

Westman
and Stromire:
Why
Not Bury M'Naghten's
Moldy Ghost?
UNIVERSITY
OF
FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
More recently Justice Terrell, writing the majority opinion in
Everett v. State, which affirmed a first degree murder conviction, remarked:62
"In the old days before we knew there were degrees of insanity,
when one went beserk, regardless of the degree of his insanity,
he was said to have 'bats in the belfry'; the phrase comprehended every aspect of mental illness."
This recognition of psychiatric progress was followed by another
pertinent observation:6 3
"It may be that the law has not developed the proper technique
for dealing with them [the insane] but such as we have, no
body of men is better qualified to cope with them than a carefully selected jury so we find no error."
The jury that can comprehend complicated medical testimony, deduce
the facts from this testimony, and then correctly apply these facts to
the issue of insanity as defined by the ambiguous M'Naghten Rule
will indeed be a "carefully selected" jury. Such a jury will rarely, if
ever, be assembled. One psychologist has described the jury determination of insanity as "praiseworthy in the show of democracy where
any citizen may enjoy the right of trial by his peers, yet ludicrous in
its logic that the laymen have any right or skill in making such a
64
decision."
CRITICISM OF THE M'NAGHTEN RULE
The courts have clung tenaciously to the right-and-wrong test
despite a heavy barrage of criticism leveled at it almost from the
moment of its inception. Nearly thirty years ago Mr. Justice Cardozo
wrote, "Everyone concedes that the present definition of insanity has
little relation to the truths of mental life."65 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
testified before the British Royal Crime Commission on Capital
Punishment: 66
So.2d 241, 245 (Fla. 1957).
631d. at 246. (Emphasis added.)
64Finn, Reflections on the Psychologist As Expert Witness, in CRIME AND INSANITY 186, 192 (1958).
65CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN Do FOR THE LAW 32 (1930).
66REP. oF ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953, Cmd. No. 8932,
6297
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"I do not see why the rules of law should be arrested at the
state of psychological knowledge of the time when they were
formulated .... I am a great believer in being as candid as possible about my institutions. They are in large measure abandoned in practice, and therefore I think the M'Naghten Rules
are in large measure shams. . . . I dare to believe that we
ought not to rest content with the difficulty of finding an improvement in the M'Naghten Rules."
Most psychiatrists agree that the M'Naghten Rule is unsound because it assumes that incapacity to know the nature and quality of an
act or to know its wrongfulness is the only significant symptom of
mental disorder.67 The test is fallacious because it concentrates on
cognition and ignores other aspects of mentation - volition and
emotion. In a series of psychological studies conducted under the
auspices of the Menninger Clinic, it was shown that the motives for
any form of behavior must be sought in the entire situation, not in
the peculiar mental state of a given individual at a given time.8 Applying the right-and-wrong test to the accused in a criminal case is
equivalent to a physician's diagnosing the ills of all patients by taking
their temperature. Certainly the doctor is expected to investigate
thoroughly and to employ all available scientific techniques in analyzing physical diseases. No less should be tolerated in cases involving
mental disease.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle in applying the right-and-wrong test
is the difficulty of communication. The expert witness in an insanity
case is expected to translate the language of modern psychiatry into
legal terminology that has remained stagnant for over a century. For
example, the word insanity is purely a legal term; the medical profession long ago divided this broad definition of mental disorder into
many subclassifications. As a result, the psychiatrist on the witness
stand is unable to express himself meaningfully. He may be convinced, as a result of his examinations, that the defendant knew the
physical nature of his act but that he had no real appreciation of its
significance because of a psychotic mental disorder affecting personality, viewpoint, and conduct. If the psychiatrist testifies that the
defendant could not distinguish right from wrong, he is probably
p. 102.
67TWEIHOFEN, TnE URGE TO PUNISH 12

(1956).

68BIoch, Legal, Sociological, and Psychiatric Variations in the Interpretation of
the Criminal Act, in CIME AND INSANITY 65, 86 (1958).
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more correctly expressing his honest judgment that the defendant
was not mentally responsible; but, strictly speaking, the answer would
not be true. This "leaves the witness with his intellectual honesty at
69
stake and no escape."
Even the proponents of the right-and-wrong test have abandoned
the position that it is a clear and certain formula and now say "that
it is broad enough to cover all the cases that
-rightly understood
should properly be covered.- 70 A British psychiatrist has expressed
this pragmatic view: "To put it in rather a bald way, the present
rules are such nonsense in many cases that the people can exercise
their own common sense, whereas with more precise rules more rigidly
interpreted the ultimate effect would not be as good as the present
one. ' ' 71 Once it is established that the old rule is not operating as it
purports to do, it is easier to consider seriously the adoption of a
more realistic rule.
ALTERNATIVES TO M'NAGHTEN

Twenty-seven years after the right-and-wrong theory of insanity
became elevated into the status of law, Judge Doe persuaded the New
Hampshire Supreme Court to reject the M'Naghten Rule on the
2
theory that no one symptom should be the basis of legal insanity.The enormity of Judge Doe's task can be appreciated by reading the
73
following excerpt from a letter he wrote to a doctor:
"The theory of the common law is that it is unchangeable,
that lawyers and judges may make mistakes, as well as men of
science, but that the law, being the perfection of reason, does
not consist of such mistakes, anymore than astronomy consists
of the idea that the earth is flat and that the sun passes over it."
69Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testimony, The Committee

on Psychiatry and Law of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Rep. No.
28, May 1954, p. 5.
70WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 60 (1956).

71Dr. D. Curran testifying before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence 486, ff6672 (1950). This and other testimony given
before the Commission make it "abundantly clear that the M'Naghten rules can
only be defended, even by their warmest supporters, as techniques whereby practical
justice is reached, and not as absolute, precise rules." Morris, "Wrong" in the
M'Naghten Rules, 16 MODERN L. REV. 435, 437 (1953).
72State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
73Letter, July 22, 1868, quoted in The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer
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Judge Doe's proposal was that criminal responsibility should be determined by the jury on the basis of whether the criminal act was
the "offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant." This
has been the legal test of insanity in New Hampshire since 1870, but
until 1954 New Hampshire stood alone. In that year the District
of Columbia, in the controversial case of Durham v. United States,7 4
beamed a modem light on Judge Doe's proposal. The Durham case
held the test of insanity to be "simply that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
'
mental defect." 5
The Durham Rule, as this concept is popularly called, is not subject to the major criticism of the old right-and-wrong test in that it
does not require the jury to decide the issue of insanity on the basis
of a single symptom. In application, the Durham Rule allows medical
experts to testify in the language of modem psychiatry rather
than be frustrated by the almost impossible task of verbalizing current medical knowledge within the framework of an obsolete legal
rule. Intelligent application of the more flexible Durham Rule by
juries should result in more just decisions.
As might be expected, the Durham Rule has been criticized by
those who cling tenaciously to the fiction of legal certainty and who
desire to retain the old right-and-wrong test. They argue that the rule
is too vague and that it sets no standard by which juries will be able
to determine whether the defendant is insane. The argument is unsound, for the Durham Rule by its very vagueness allows the jury to
decide the factual question of the accused's sanity in light of current
medical knowledge. In this way the law may stay abreast of new advances in medical knowledge rather than sterilize itself through outdated medical theories.
There is little doubt that the M'Naghten Rule, as the legal test
of insanity, should be revised or rejected in favor of a more realistic
one. The Durham Rule is a step in the right direction; but, regardless of the effort expended in perfecting a better rule, the results will
always be questionable as long as lay juries are asked to equate legal
insanity with medical psychosis. A lay jury can never be expected to
determine as well as a group of qualified medical experts the question
of an accused's insanity. The idea of making insanity a medical
Collaboration in the Jurisprudenceof Mental Disease, 63 YALE L.J. 183, 191 (1953).
74214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
751d. at 874.
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